

EXHIBIT 42

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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	:	21 MC 97 (AKH)
IN RE SEPTEMBER 11 LITIGATION	:	
	:	
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	:	21 MC 101 (AKH)
IN RE SEPTEMBER 11 PROPERTY DAMAGE	:	
AND BUSINESS LOSS LITIGATION	:	
	:	
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PROPOSED STIPULATION OF FACTS¹

1. Flight 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta purchased two Victorinox Swiss Army knives at the Zurich Airport on July 8, 2001, and a Leatherman multi-tool in Boynton Beach, Florida, on August 30, 2001. (Aviation Monograph, hereinafter "A.M." 4).
2. On August 13, 2001, Flight 175 hijacker Marwan al Shehhi purchased two short-bladed knives, a Cliphanger Viper and an Imperial Tradesman Dual Edge. On the same day and in the same city, Flight 175 hijacker Fayez Banihammad bought a Stanley two-piece snap knife set (a type of multi-tool), and Flight 175 hijacker Hamza al Ghamdi purchased a Leatherman Wave multi-tool. (A.M. 17)
3. According to financial transaction data, at least seven knives were purchased by all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers including two Victorinox Swiss Army knives, three Leatherman multi-tool knives, two pocket knives, and one Stanley two-piece snap knife set. The FBI collected 14 pieces of evidence of knives or portions of knives, including a box cutter, at the Flight 93 crash site. None of the blades or knife housings recovered at the crash site indicated a blade length longer than 3.5 inches. (A.M. 4, 17, 27, 35).
4. Four of the 19 hijackers, one aboard each flight, received flight training, possessed FAA certificates as qualified pilots, and honed their skills at flight simulator facilities. Each of the four pilots received flight training in the United States. (A.M. 49).
5. Of the five hijackers for Flight 11, only Atta held an FAA pilot certification. Atta received flight training at facilities in Florida and Georgia. (A.M. 49).

¹ The parties agree and understand that a stipulation to any fact does not foreclose any party from admitting the original source document or statement at trial.

6. Of the five hijackers for Flight 175, only Marwan al Shehhi held an FAA pilot certification. Marwan al Shehhi received flight training in Florida and Georgia. (A.M. 50).
7. Logan Airport parking records showed that rental cars associated with the hijackers had been in and out of the airport's parking facility over several days prior to 9/11. (A.M. 85 n.22).

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 11

8. At 5:40 A.M. on September 11, 2001, a car rented in Boston on September 9 by Mohamed Atta entered the Portland International Jetport parking facility. (A.M. 2).
9. At 5:43 A.M., Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari checked in at the US Airways ticket counter at the Portland Jetport. Atta checked two bags, Omari none. (A.M. 2, Commission Report, hereinafter "C.R." 1).
10. The agent who checked in the two hijackers recalled that when he handed Atta his boarding pass, Atta asked why he was not given a boarding pass for his connecting flight on American Airlines from Boston to Los Angeles. The agent explained to Atta that he would have to check in with American Airlines in Boston to obtain the boarding pass for the second leg of his itinerary. The agent remembered that Atta clenched his jaw and looked as though he was about to get angry. Atta stated that he was assured he would have "one-step check-in." The agent told them that they had better get going if they were to make their flight. He said that Atta looked as if he were about to say something in anger but turned to leave. (A.M. 2).
11. When he checked in, Atta was randomly designated as a "selectee" by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System ("CAPPS"). (A.M. 2, C.R. 1).
12. Ten out of the 19 hijackers (including nine out of ten on American Airlines Flights 11 and 77) were identified via the CAPPS system on September 11, 2001. (C.R. 451 n.1).
13. At 5:45 A.M., Atta and Omari arrived at the sole security checkpoint at the Portland Jetport. The checkpoint was under the custodial responsibility of Delta Airlines, which contracted for security screening services with Globe Aviation Services. The checkpoint had two lanes, each outfitted with a walk-through metal detector and X-ray equipment. (A.M. 3).
14. Videotape of the Portland checkpoint showed that Atta and Omari entered the walk through metal detector at 5:45:03 A.M. A screener was stationed at the device to monitor the screening. Both Atta and Omari proceeded from the magnetometer immediately to the X-ray belt. Atta picked up a black shoulder bag. Omari claimed a similar bag, and also a smaller black case that he held in both hands. Neither of the

bags was physically examined by a screener. Both of the subjects passed out of view of the video camera at 5:45:15 A.M. (A.M. 3).

15. Colgan Air Flight 5930 was a Beechcraft 1900 – a 19-seat regional airliner. It departed from Gate 11 on time at 6:00 A.M., arriving at Gate B9 (A) at Logan International Airport at approximately 6:45 A.M., one hour before the scheduled departure of Flight 11. (A.M. 3, C.R. 1). Upon arrival at Logan, Atta and Omari still had their carry-on shoulder bags. (A.M. 5).
16. Atta's two checked bags were unloaded from the Colgan Air flight. The luggage tags indicated that they should be transferred to American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles International Airport. (A.M. 5). The two bags that Atta checked were not loaded aboard Flight 11 before the flight departed. After the attacks the bags were opened and law enforcement found a Koran, a tape on flying a jetliner, a large folding knife and a ruler. (A.M. 85-85 n.25).
17. After exiting the aircraft, Atta and Omari crossed a parking lot that separated their arrival and departure terminals. They were observed asking for directions. (A.M. 5).
18. The American Airlines Flight 11 hijackers were Atta, Omari, Waleed al Shehri, Wail al Shehri and Satam al Suqami. (A.M. 4).
19. At 6:45 A.M., Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, and Satam al Suqami arrived at Logan and parked their rental car at the airport's central parking facility. (A.M. 5).
20. Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, and Satam al Suqami were selected by CAPPS. (A.M. 5, C.R. 2). Waleed al Shehri did not check a bag. The others checked in one each. Their checked luggage was screened by an explosives detection system and loaded aboard the aircraft. (A.M. 5).
21. Globe, under a contract with American Airlines, operated the two checkpoints through which all five hijackers had to pass to reach their departure gate after checking in. The smaller checkpoint opened at 7:15 A.M. and was used mainly for overflow traffic from the other. (A.M. 5, C.R. 2).
22. At 6:52 A.M., Atta received a phone call originating from a pay phone in Logan Airport's Terminal C. The phone call was located between the checkpoint and the boarding gate for United Airlines Flight 175. The phone call lasted three minutes. (A.M. 5, C.R. 1, C.R. 451 n.3).
23. At approximately 7:31 A.M., Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri boarded Flight 11. Atta and Omari followed at approximately 7:39 A.M. Suqami boarded a minute later. (A.M. 6, C.R. 2).
24. Flight 11 provided daily, nonstop service from Logan to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). (A.M. 6, C.R. 4). On September 11, it was scheduled for a 7:45

A.M. departure. (A.M. 6, C.R. 2). The aircraft was a Boeing 767, tail number N334AA. (A.M. 6, C.R. 4). The aircraft had two aisles. (A.M. 48).

25. Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted Flight 11. (A.M. 6, C.R. 4). It carried its full capacity of nine flight attendants:
 - a. Karen Martin (Position 1), was assigned to the forward left jumpseat (1L), located between the first-class cabin and the cockpit entrance;
 - b. Kathleen Nicosia (Position 2), was assigned to the left aft jumpseat (3L) at the back of the aircraft;
 - c. Betty Ong (Position 3), was assigned to the right aft jumpseat (3R) at the back of the aircraft behind the coach section;
 - d. Dianne Snyder (Position 4), was assigned to the mid-galley jumpseat (2R);
 - e. Barbara "Bobbi" Arestegui (Position 5), was assigned to the forward right jumpseat (1R Center), which was in the forward galley between the cockpit and the first class cabin;
 - f. Jeffrey Collman (Position 6), was assigned to the middle left jumpseat (2L) located in the middle galley within the main cabin;
 - g. Sara Low (Position 7), was assigned to the middle right jumpseat (2R) in the middle galley within the main cabin;
 - h. Jean Roger (Position 8), was assigned to the forward left jumpseat (1L Center) in the forward galley; and
 - i. Madeline "Amy" Sweeney (Position 9), was assigned to the left aft jumpseat (3L) at the back of the aircraft behind the coach section. (A.M. 6, C.R. 452 n.23).
26. The aircraft had a capacity of 158 passengers: 9 seats in first class, 30 in business class, and 119 in coach. (A.M. 6).
27. On September 11, the flight carried 81 passengers (including the 5 terrorists) with 2 pilots and 9 flight attendants, for a total of 92 people on board. (A.M. 6, C.R. 4).
28. All 9 of the first-class seats were occupied, 2 of them by hijackers Waleed al Shehri (2B) and Wail al Shehri (2A). Nineteen of the 30 seats in business class were occupied (49 percent), 3 by hijackers Atta (8D), Omari (8G), and Suqami (10B). Fifty-three of the 119 coach seats were occupied (44 percent), none of them by hijackers. (A.M. 6, C.R. 2).
29. The percentage of seats occupied on the aircraft – also known as the "load factor" – on September 11, 2001, was 51 percent, compared to an average load factor for Flight 11 of almost 39 percent on Tuesdays over the three months preceding 9/11. (A.M. 6).
30. All of the hijackers were accounted for in checking in and boarding Flight 11. American's records do not reflect the use of a cockpit jump seat by anyone other than the Flight 11 pilot and first officer. (A.M. 7).

31. Under American Airline's policy in effect on 9/11, every crew member, including each of the flight attendants, had a key to the cockpit. (A.M. 7, C.R. 453 n.26). The airline's Flight Standards Manual instructed the crews to guard their keys carefully. (A.M. 7).
32. The American Airlines dispatcher in charge of Flight 11 said that all aspects of preflight preparation were routine. She reported having no preflight communications with the pilot or aircraft because no problems or issues in need of resolution arose. (A.M. 7, C.R. 4).
33. Flight 11 was loaded with 76,400 pounds of fuel, above the average fuel load of 70,000 pounds. (A.M. 7).
34. At 7:40 A.M., Flight 11 pushed back from Gate 32 and taxied to its departure runway. It took off at 7:59 A.M. (A.M. 7, C.R. 2, 4, 451 n.4).
35. Shortly before 8:14 A.M., Flight 11 reached an altitude of 26,000 feet, just shy of its initial cruising altitude of 29,000 feet. (A.R. 7, C.R. 4). Up to this point, all communications and the flight's appearance to air traffic controllers were normal. (A.R. 7, C.R. 4).
36. FAA air traffic controller Peter Zalewski, stationed at the Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (Boston Center) radioed directional instructions "American 11 turn twenty degrees right." Flight 11 replied "twenty right American 11." This was the last routine communication received from the flight. Seconds later, air traffic control radioed Flight 11 again, this time instructing the aircraft to climb to 35,000 feet. The flight did not respond. Over the next ten minutes, air traffic control tried nine times to contact the flight. All attempts were unsuccessful. (A.M. 7, C.R. 4).
37. At around 8:14 A.M. or shortly thereafter, the hijackers began their takeover of the aircraft. Information supplied by eyewitness accounts indicates that the hijackers initiated and sustained their command of the aircraft using knives (as reported by two flight attendants); violence, including stabbing and slashing (as reported by two flight attendants); the threat of violence (as indicated by a hijacker in radio transmissions received by air traffic control); Mace (reported by one flight attendant); the threat of a bomb, either fake or real (reported by one flight attendant); and deception about their intentions (as indicated by a hijacker in a radio transmission received by air traffic control). (A.M. 8, C.R. 5).
38. At 8:19 A.M., flight attendant Betty Ong contacted the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, via AT&T air phone to report an emergency aboard the flight. Flight attendants know the reservation 800 number because they call it frequently to help passengers with reservations questions. Calls to the number are routed to the first open line at one of several facilities, including the one in Cary. The emergency call from Betty Ong lasted approximately 25 minutes, from 8:19 A.M. to 8:44 A.M. Ong relayed vital information about events

taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground. Her call was received initially at the reservations office by an American Airlines employee. The call was transferred to another employee who pushed an emergency button that simultaneously initiated a tape recording of the call and sent an alarm notifying Nydia Gonzalez ("Gonzalez"), the reservations office supervisor, to pick up on the line. Gonzalez was paged to respond to the alarm and joined the call a short time later. Only the first four minutes of the phone call between Ong and the reservations center was tape-recorded because the recently installed recording system at that time contained a default time limit. (A.M. 8, C.R. 5).

39. At 8:19 A.M., Ong reported, "The cockpit is not answering, somebody's stabbed in business class – and I think there's mace – that we can't breathe – I don't know, I think we're getting hijacked." (A.M. 8, C.R. 5, C.R. 453 n. 29).
40. At 8:20 A.M., Ong reported that two flight attendants had been stabbed. (A.M. 9, C.R. 5).
41. At 8:21 A.M., the transponder on Flight 11 was switched off. (A.M. 9, C.R. 18).
42. At 8:21 A.M., Gonzalez joined the call from Ong. She used another phone line to contact Craig Marquis, manager on duty, at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) in Fort Worth, Texas, and informed the airline's headquarters that there was a problem aboard Flight 11. Gonzalez's emergency call to the SOC was recorded at the airline's headquarters. Gonzalez notified Marquis that Flight 11 was reporting an emergency, that stabbings had taken place, and that the flight attendants could not reach the cockpit. (A.M. 9, C.R. 5).
43. At 8:22 A.M., after confirming Gonzalez's identity and position, Marquis acknowledged the emergency and indicated to Gonzalez that he would "get ATC [air traffic control] on here." At this same time, while Marquis was relating this information to Gonzalez, Ong reported to Gonzalez's colleague: "I think the guys [hijackers] are up there. They might have gone there, jammed their way up there, or something. Nobody can call the cockpit. We can't even get inside." Thirty seconds after contacting American Airlines' headquarters, Gonzalez rejoined the call from Ong. (A.M. 9).
44. At 8:22 A.M., flight attendant Madeline "Amy" Sweeney tried to contact the American Airlines flight services office at Logan Airport by air phone. The office she was attempting to call managed the scheduling and operation of flight attendants, and its phone number was well known to the American flight attendants operating out of Boston. Sweeney's initial attempt to get through to the office failed. (A.M. 9).
45. At 8:23 A.M., the tape recording of the call between Ong and the reservations center ceased because of the default time limit on the system. However, Gonzalez remained on the line with Ong for the next 21 minutes. Gonzalez continued to report the information she received from the flight attendant to the American Airlines SOC.

The call between American's reservations facility and the SOC continued to be taped by the SOC until its conclusion. (A.M. 10).

46. At 8:24 A.M., Ong told Gonzalez that the hijackers were in the cockpit. (A.M.10).
47. Shortly before 8:25 A.M., air traffic controller Zalewski heard two clicks over the frequency assigned to the flight, and radioed in response, "Is that American eleven trying to call?" Five seconds later, a voice with a foreign accent addressed the passengers. "We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you'll be okay. We're returning to the airport." Because the wrong button was pushed, this message was heard not by the passengers but by air traffic control. (A.M.10, C.R. 6).
48. Seconds later, Boston Center heard the following transmission from the same foreign voice: "Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." According to Ong's simultaneous reporting, no announcement had been made from the cockpit to the passengers. (A.M. 10, C.R. 6).
49. At 8:25 A.M., Sweeney's third call to the American Airlines Flight Services Office at Boston finally was connected to an American Airlines' employee. Sweeney told her that someone was hurt aboard Flight 12, and then the phone call was cut off. The recipient of the call passed the information to Michael Woodward ("Woodward"), the flight service manager. Woodward went to American's gate area at Logan with a colleague. (A.M. 10, C.R. 6).
50. At 8:26 A.M., Ong reported to Gonzalez that the plane was "flying erratically." Gonzalez passed this information to the SOC. (A.M. 11, C.R. 6).
51. At 8:28 A.M., Flight 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south. (A.M. 11, C.R. 6).
52. At 8:31 A.M., a controller at Boston Center told the American Airlines air traffic control specialist that the last known altitude of the aircraft was below 29,000 feet and that "He [Flight 11] was heading west. But right now he's pointed southwest of Albany." The controller also said the transponder had been lost and that "the controller heard a threat in the background, but that's unconfirmed and we're trying to pull the tape at this time." (A.M. 11).
53. At about 8:32 A.M., Woodward returned to his office and discovered that Sweeney had called again and was speaking with an employee in the office. Woodward, who was a friend of Sweeney's, took over the call. The phone call between Sweeney and Woodward lasted approximately 12 minutes. It was not taped. She provided the following information: she was sitting in the back of the aircraft next to Betty Ong; the plane had been hijacked; a man in first class had had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had been stabbed – one flight attendant had been stabbed seriously and was on oxygen while another flight attendant's wounds were not as serious and seemed to

be okay; a doctor had been paged; the flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit. (A.M. 11, C.R. 6).

54. Sweeney told Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information as they could to people on the ground. (A.M. 12, C.R. 6).
55. Sometime after 8:30 A.M., but before 8:45 A.M., American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey made a routine call to the airline's SOC and was informed that personnel there were on the phone with a flight attendant who was reporting violence and a cockpit intrusion on one of the company's flights. (A.M. 12).
56. At 8:33 A.M., Gonzalez received a report from Ong providing the first indication of a fatality on board. Gonzalez passed the information on to Marquis at 8:34 A.M. as follows: "They think they might have a fatality on the flight. One of our passengers, possibly on 9B, Levin or Lewis, might have been fatally stabbed." (A.M. 12).
57. At 8:34 A.M., the Boston controller received a third transmission from Flight 11: "Nobody move please. We are going back to the airport. Don't try to make any stupid moves." (A.M. 12, C.R. 19).
58. At 8:35 A.M., Gonzalez confirmed the details of a report by Ong regarding the identity of one of the hijackers: "He's the one that's in the – he's in the cockpit. Okay you said Tom Sukani? Okay – Okay and he was in 10B. Okay, okay, so he's one of the persons that are in the cockpit. And as far as weapons, all they have are just knives?" (A.M. 12).
59. At 8:36 A.M., Marquis received Gonzalez's report about the hijacker she referred to as "Tom al Sukani" (i.e., Satam al Suqami), who had been seated in 10B. He then initiated action to "lockout" American Airlines Flight 11. This procedure is standard for airlines in safety and security incidents. (A.M. 12).
60. From 8:37 A.M. to 8:38 A.M., Gonzalez reported to Marquis that the passengers had been moved out of first class and back to coach and that the plane was flying erratically again. American completed its lockout of Flight 11. Also at 8:38 A.M., Gonzalez reported that the plane was in a rapid descent. Marquis asked a fellow employee in the SOC if Flight 11 was descending. The employee replied, "We don't know. The transponder is off so we have no active read on him." (A.M. 13).
61. At 8:40 A.M., an American Airlines employee in Boston who was standing next to Michael Woodward as he talked to Sweeney contacted an employee in American Airlines' SOC. She reported the content of the ongoing call between Woodward and Sweeney, including that Sweeney said the hijackers were Middle Eastern men seated in 10B, 9D, and 9G; one spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English; she did not know how they had gained entry to the cockpit; and the aircraft was in a rapid descent. (A.M. 14, C.R. 6).

62. At 8:41 A.M., Marquis instructed an unidentified colleague in the SOC: "Tell ATC to handle this as an emergency." The colleague replied, "They have in there it's been hijacked." The manager responded: "It is. Okay." The colleague then informed Marquis, "They think he's [Flight 11] headed toward Kennedy. They're moving everybody out of the way. They seem to have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending." (A.M. 14, C.R. 6).
63. At 8:44 A.M., Gonzalez reported to Marquis that phone contact with Ong had been terminated: "We, I think we might have lost her." About this same time, Sweeney reported to Woodward in Boston, "Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent...we are all over the place." Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sweeney told him, "We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way too low." Seconds later she said, "Oh my God we are way too low" and then the phone call ended. (A.M. 14, C.R. 6-7).
64. At 8:45 A.M., the American Airlines employee listening to the call between Woodward and Sweeney reported to the SOC: "She [Sweeney] started screaming and saying something's wrong and now he's [Woodward] having trouble – now he thinks he might be disconnected. Okay, we just lost connection." (A.M. 14).
65. At 8:46:40 A.M., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. (A.M. 15, C.R. 7).

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175

66. The hijackers of Flight 175 were Marwan al Shehhi, Mohand al Shehri, Hamza al Ghamdi, Fayez Banihammad, and Ahmed al Ghamdi. (A.M. 17).
67. At 6:20 A.M., Ahmed al Ghamdi and Hamza al Ghamdi checked in at the United Air Lines (UAL) ticket counter at Logan International Airport in Boston. They approached a United Air Lines customer service representative, who immediately referred them to another agent because one of the men presented a "certificate" that the first agent was unfamiliar with. The second customer service representative said that one of the two men told her that he needed a ticket. She examined his documents and found that he already had a UAL envelope with an itinerary and ticket in his hand. She told him that he did not need a ticket but could check-in. The men checked two bags and each had one carry-on bag resembling a briefcase. Each man had "problems" answering the standard security questions and the customer service representative had to repeat them "very slowly." After the questioning, the men departed the counter area for the security checkpoint. (A.M. 17, C.R. 2, 451 n.5).
68. At 6:20 A.M., Ahmed al Ghamdi checked two bags that were loaded on the aircraft at 6:31 A.M. (A.M. 18).

69. At 6:45 A.M., Marwan al Shehhi checked a single bag. It was loaded on the plane at 6:51 A.M. (A.M. 18).
70. At 6:52 A.M., a call was placed to Mohamed Atta's cell phone from a pay phone in Terminal C located between the screening checkpoint and the departure gate. The call lasted three minutes. (A.M. 18, C.R. 1).
71. At 6:53 A.M., Faye Banihammad (listed in the airline passenger record as Faye Ahmed) and Mohand al Shehri (listed as Mohald) checked in. Banihammad checked two bags, which were loaded at 6:57 A.M. (A.M. 18).
72. None of the Flight 175 hijackers was selected for additional security scrutiny by the CAPPS system. (A.M. 18, C.R. 2).
73. Logan Airport did not use video cameras to monitor activities at security checkpoints. (A.M. 18).
74. To reach their departure gate, after checking in, the hijackers had to pass through a checkpoint in Terminal C before boarding. The checkpoint was under the custodial responsibility of United Air Lines. It had contracted the screening duties to Huntleigh USA Corporation. (A.M. 18, C.R. 2).
75. Faye Banihammad boarded the flight at 7:23 A.M. He was seated in 2A (first class). Mohand al Shehri boarded at the same time and sat next to him in 2B. Four minutes later, both Marwan al Shehhi, seated in 6C (business class), and Ahmed al Ghamdi, seated in 9D (business class), embarked. At 7:28 A.M., Hamza al Ghamdi was the last hijacker to board the flight; he sat in 9C (business class). (A.M. 18, C.R. 2).
76. Flight 175 was scheduled to depart Logan at 8:00 A.M. for Los Angeles International Airport. The aircraft was a Boeing 767, with tail number N612UA. (A.M. 18, C.R. 2, 7).
77. Captain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks piloted the plane. (A.M. 18, C.R. 7). The flight attendants were:
 - a. Robert Fangman was assigned to the middle center jump seat between the middle galley and coach;
 - b. Amy Jarrett was assigned to the right jump seat, located in the back of the plane between coach and the rear galley;
 - c. Amy King was assigned to the forward center jump seat, located between the forward galley and the first-class cabin;
 - d. Kathryn Laborie was assigned to the forward left jump seat next to the cockpit entrance;
 - e. Alfred Marchand was assigned the forward center jump seat, located between the forward galley and the first-class cabin;
 - f. Michael Tarrou was assigned to the rear left jump seat, located in the back of the plane between coach and the rear galley; and

- g. Alicia Titus was assigned to the middle center jump seat between the middle galley and coach. (A.M. 18-19, C.R. 7, 454 n.41).
- 78. The aircraft had a capacity of 168 passengers: 10 in first class, 33 in business class, and 125 in coach. The flight carried 56 passengers (including 5 hijackers) with 2 pilots and 7 flight attendants, for a total of 65 people on board. (A.M. 19, C.R. 7).
- 79. Nine of the 10 first-class seats were occupied, including 2 by hijackers Banihammad and al Shehri. Eleven of the 33 business-class seats were occupied, 3 by hijackers Shehhi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and Ahmed al Ghamdi; and 36 of the 125 coach seats were occupied, none by hijackers. (A.M. 19).
- 80. The 56 passengers represented a load factor of one-third of the plane's passenger capacity. This figure is considerably below the 49 percent average load factor for Flight 175 for Tuesdays in the three-month period prior to September 11. It represented the third-lowest load factor among the scheduled flights during that period, when Tuesdays were the least traveled day for Flight 175. (A.M. 19, C.R. 454 n.40).
- 81. There is no evidence that the Flight 175 hijackers purchased additional tickets for the flight beyond the ones they actually used. (A.M. 19).
- 82. All the hijackers were accounted for on the flight, and according to United's records, no paperwork was filed to indicate that any cockpit jumpseat was occupied by anyone other than flight crew. (A.M. 19).
- 83. Under United Air Lines policy at the time, a key to the cockpit door was stowed in a designated place near the cockpit door. Flight attendants did not carry cockpit door keys. (A.M. 19, C.R. 454 n.41).
- 84. Flight 175 was loaded with 76,000 pounds of fuel, a normal amount for the cross-country flight. (A.M. 19).
- 85. At 7:58 A.M., Flight 175 pushed back from Gate 19 in Terminal C, and it departed Logan Airport at 8:14 A.M. (A.M. 19, C.R. 7).
- 86. At 8:19 A.M., Flight 175 made radio contact with a Boston Center air traffic controller. (A.M. 19).
- 87. At 8:33 A.M., Flight 175 reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000 feet. (A.M. 20, C.R. 7).
- 88. At 8:38 A.M., the crew of Flight 175 radioed air traffic control that they had spotted Flight 11 at 28,000 or 29,000 feet. FAA air traffic control told them to turn their aircraft to avoid Flight 11. (A.M. 20, C.R. 454, n.42).

89. At 8:41 A.M., the flight crew of Flight 175 reported to air traffic controllers that “we heard a suspicious transmission [from another aircraft] on our departure out of Boston – like someone keyed the mike and said everyone stay in your seats.” (A.M. 20).
90. At 8:42 A.M., the flight crew of Flight 175 completed their report on the “suspicious transmission” they had received from another plane. This was the flight’s last communication with the ground. (A.M. 20, C.R. 7).
91. Between 8:42 A.M. and 8:46 A.M., the hijackers began their takeover of the flight. (A.M. 20, C.R. 7).
92. The hijackers initiated and sustained their command of the aircraft using knives (as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant), Mace (reported by one passenger), and the threat of a bomb (reported by the same passenger). They stabbed flight crew members (as reported by a flight attendant and one passenger) and killed both pilots, (as reported by a flight attendant). All of these eyewitness accounts were provided via phone calls from the back of the plane, even though the passengers calling had each been assigned a seat in the front or middle of the cabin. (A.M. 20, C.R. 7).
93. At 8:47 A.M., Flight 175’s transponder code changed twice within a one-minute period. David Bottiglia, the New York Center air traffic controller responsible for Flight 175 was also handling Flight 11, which he was told had been hijacked. At this point he was trying to locate Flight 11 and did not notice the transponder code changes on Flight 175 until 8:51 A.M. (A.M. 21, C.R. 7).
94. At 8:51 A.M., Flight 175 deviated from its assigned altitude. (A.M. 21, C.R. 7, 21).
95. At 8:52 A.M., David Bottiglia made the first of five unsuccessful attempts over a three-minute period to contact the flight. (A.M. 21, C.R. 7, 21).
96. At 8:52 A.M., Lee Hanson received a phone call from his son, passenger Peter Burton Hanson, who told him that the flight was being hijacked. “I think they’ve taken over the cockpit – An attendant has been stabbed – and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is making strange moves. Call United Air Lines – Tell them it’s Flight 175, Boston to LA.” (A.M. 21, C.R. 7).
97. At 8:52 A.M., Marc Policastro, an employee at the United Air Lines maintenance office in San Francisco (SAMC), received a phone call from a male flight attendant on Flight 175 who reported that the aircraft had been hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and he believed the hijackers were flying the plane. The call lasted about two minutes. Policastro tried unsuccessfully to contact the flight via ACARS. Another employee at the maintenance office also tried to contact Flight 175 with an ACARS message around this time, with a message requesting the flight crew to confirm reports of an incident onboard. None of these or any subsequent attempts to contact Flight 175 were acknowledged from the aircraft. (A.M. 21, C.R. 7-8).

98. Beginning at 8:52 A.M., and continuing until 8:59 A.M., a passenger unsuccessfully tried a total of four times to reach his wife on both her business and home phone lines. (A.M. 21).
99. At 8:57 A.M., Flight 175 turned to the northeast and leveled off at 28,500 feet. One minute later, it headed toward New York City. (A.M. 22, C.R. 8).
100. At 8:59 A.M., passenger Brian David Sweeney attempted to call his wife, Julie. He left a message on their home answering machine telling her that the plane had been hijacked. (A.M. 22, C.R. 8).
101. At 9:00 A.M., passenger Brian David Sweeney called his mother and told her that his flight had been hijacked. He said that the passengers were thinking about storming the cockpit to wrest control of the plane away from the hijackers. He thought they were flying somewhere over Ohio. Immediately after the call from her son, Mrs. Sweeney turned on the television and saw the second aircraft crash into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. (A.M. 22, C.R. 8).
102. At 9:00 A.M., Lee Hanson received a second call from his son who told him "It's getting bad, Dad - A stewardess was stabbed - They seem to have knives and Mace - They said they have a bomb - It's getting very bad on the plane - Passengers are throwing up and getting sick - The plane is making jerky movements - I don't think the pilot is flying the plane - I think we are going down - I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building." The call ended abruptly. Hanson heard a woman scream just before it cut off. Hanson did not know whether his son had hung up or the phone had malfunctioned. After the call, Hanson turned on his television. He watched as the second plane slammed into the South Tower. (A.M. 22-23, C.R. 8).
103. At 9:03:11 A.M., United Air Lines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. The aircraft was traveling at over 587 miles per hour at impact. All on board and an unknown number in the building were killed instantly. (A.M. 24, C.R. 8).
104. At 9:19 A.M., Ed Ballinger, the United flight dispatcher responsible for the airline's East to West Coast flights, sent the following ACARS message to his airborne flights: "Beware any cockpit intrusion...Two aircraft in NY hit trade center builds." (A.M. 26).
105. At 9:23 A.M., Ed Ballinger sent out his "cockpit intrusion" message to Flight 175. At this time, while the dispatcher was aware that two large aircraft (including one United airliner) had crashed into the World Trade Center and that Flight 175 had been hijacked, he was not aware that Flight 175 had crashed. (A.M. 26).

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77

106. Hijackers: Hani Hanjour (pilot); Khalid al Mihdhar; Nawaf al Hazmi; Salem al Hazmi; Majed Moqed. (A.M. 27).
107. On August 27, Nawaf al Hazmi purchased Leatherman multi-tool knives. (A.M. 27).
108. At approximately 7:15 A.M., Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter at Dulles and proceeded to checkpoint screening. (A.M. 27, C.R. 3).
109. Security screening for Flight 77 was conducted at the east and west checkpoints in the Main Terminal. (A.M. 27).
110. United Air Lines had custodial responsibility for the screening and contracted out the work to Argenbright Security. (A.M. 27, C.R. 3).
111. All five of the hijackers passed through the same checkpoint. (A.M. 27, C.R. 3).
112. Closed-circuit television recorded all passengers, including the hijackers, as they were screened. (A.M. 27, C.R. 3).
113. 7:18 A.M. Moqed and Mihdhar entered the security screening checkpoint. They placed their carry-on bags on the X-ray machine belt and proceeded through the first walk-through metal detector. Both set off the alarm and were directed to a second metal detector. While Mihdhar did not trigger the second metal detector and was permitted through the checkpoint, Moqed failed once again. A security officer screened him with a hand-held metal detection wand. He passed this cursory inspection. (A.M. 27, C.R. 3).
114. Hani Hanjour checked in for Flight 77 sometime between 7:15 and 7:35 A.M. (C.R. 3).
115. In response to questions from the Commission, American Airlines has been unable to locate information about the check-in time for Hani Hanjour. However, it had to have taken place between 7:25 A.M., when he may have parked the rental car in the airport parking lot, and 7:35 A.M, when he appears on the checkpoint videotape. (A.M. 93 n.225).
116. At approximately 7:29 A.M., Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi checked in at the American ticket counter. (A.M. 27; C.R. 452 n.11).

117. 7:35 A.M. Hani Hanjour placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt and passed through the metal detector. He picked up his carry-on bags and proceeded through the checkpoint. (A.M. 27, C.R. 3).
118. 7:36 A.M. Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem, with one carry-on bag, successfully cleared the magnetometer and was permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf set off the alarms for both the first and second magnetometers. He was hand-wanded and his shoulder bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector before he was allowed to proceed. The video footage showed that he was carrying an unidentified item clipped to the rim of his back pants pocket. (A.M. 27, C.R. 3).
119. The videotape evidence reviewed by the Commission indicates that all five Flight 77 hijackers passed through the west checkpoint that three of the five set off at least one magnetometer alarm, and that two set off both magnetometers and were hand-wanded. (A.M. 93 n.226).
120. CAPPS selected all five of the Flight 77 hijackers for added security scrutiny. Hanjour, Mihdhar and Moqed were chosen by the computer algorithm. (A.M. 27, C.R. 3).
121. Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi were both made CAPPS selectees at the discretion of the airline's customer service representative who checked them in. (A.M. 27, C.R. 3). The agent reported that one of the hijackers, Salem, presented identification without a picture and did not seem to be able to understand English. He said that he thought both were suspicious and made sure he made both of them selectees. (A.M. 27).
122. The only consequence of selection, however, was that their bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had boarded the aircraft. Thus, Hanjour, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Mihdhar, who did not check any bags on September 11, suffered no consequences from their selection by the system. For Salem al Hazmi, who checked two bags, and Moqed, who checked one bag, the sole consequence was that their baggage was not loaded onto Flight 77 until after their boarding was confirmed. (A.M. 28).
123. At approximately 7:50 A.M., Moqed and Mihdhar boarded Flight 77 and were seated in seats 12A and 12B of coach, respectively. (A.M. 28, C.R. 3).
124. Hanjour, assigned to seat 1B, in first class, boarded at approximately 7:52A.M. (A.M. 28, C.R. 3).
125. Finally, Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi, occupying seats 5E and 5F in first class, boarded at approximately 7:55 A.M. (A.M. 28, C.R. 4).
126. Flight 77 provided nonstop service between Washington Dulles International Airport and Los Angeles International Airport. (A.M. 28, C.R. 8).

127. It [Flight 77] was scheduled to depart at 8:10 A.M. (A.M. 28, C.R. 8).
128. The aircraft was a Boeing 757, tail number N644AA. (A.M. 28, C.R. 8).
129. Captain Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois piloted the plane. (A.M. 28, C.R. 8).
130. The flight attendants on Flight 77 were:
 - a. Michele Heidenberger, assigned to the rear left jump seat in the very back of the plane at takeoff;
 - b. Jennifer G. Lewis, assigned to the right middle jump seat between first class and coach (and therefore between the hijackers in 5E and 5F and those in 12A and 12B);
 - c. Kenneth E. Lewis, assigned to the right rear jump seat; and
 - d. Renee May, assigned to the forward left jump seat next to the entry area and between the first row of first class and the cockpit. (A.M. 28, C.R. 8).
131. The aircraft had a capacity of 176 passengers, 22 in first class and 154 in coach. (A.M. 28).
132. On September 11, 2001, the flight carried 58 passengers (including 5 hijackers) with 2 pilots and 4 flight attendants for a total of 64 people on board. (A.M. 28, C.R. 8).
133. Fifteen of the 22 first-class seats were occupied, 3 by hijackers. Forty-three of the 154 economy seats aboard were occupied, 2 by hijackers. (A.M. 28).
134. All the hijackers were assigned seats as they checked in and boarded the flight. (A.M. 29).
135. According to American's records, "no documentation for a jump seat passenger was filed for Flight 77." (A.M. 29).
136. There is no evidence to suggest that any hijacker was admitted into the cockpit and permitted to sit in a jump seat prior to the takeover. (A.M. 29).
137. As on Flight 11, under American Airline policy in effect on 9/11, every crew member, including each of the flight attendants, had a key to the cockpit. (A.M. 29).
138. Flight 77 pushed back from Dulles Gate D-26 at 8:09 A.M. (A.M. 29, C.R. 8).
139. 8:20 A.M. Flight 77 took off from Dulles. (A.M. 29, C.R. 8).
140. 8:40 A.M. After proceeding normally through air space controlled by the Washington Air Traffic Control Center (Washington Center), Flight 77 was handed off to the Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center (Indianapolis Center), with which it made routine radio contact. (A.M. 29).

141. 8:46 A.M. Flight 77 reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. (A.M. 29, C.R. 8).
142. 8:51 A.M. Flight 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication, an acknowledgment from the cockpit crew to air traffic control's navigational instructions. (A.M. 29, C.R. 8).
143. Between 8:51 A.M. and 8:54 A.M., the hijackers began their takeover of the aircraft. (A.M. 29, C.R. 8).
144. They initiated and sustained their command of the aircraft using knives and box cutters (reported by one passenger) and moved all of the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one flight attendant and one passenger). (A.M. 29, C.R. 8).
145. A passenger reported that an announcement had been made by the "pilot" that the plane had been hijacked. (C.R. 8).
146. Neither of the firsthand accounts to come from Flight 77, from a flight attendant and from a passenger, mentioned any actual use of violence (e.g., stabbings) or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace. (A.M. 29, C.R. 8).
147. Both of these witnesses began the flight in the first-class cabin. (A.M. 29).
148. 8:54 A.M. The aircraft deviated from its assigned course by making a slight turn to the south. (A.M. 29, C.R. 9).
149. 8:56 A.M. The transponder was switched off, and the aircraft was lost on primary radar. (A.M. 29, C.R. 454 n.54).
150. The controller tracking Flight 77 continued to look for it. (A.M. 29).
151. He [the controller tracking Flight 77] searched along its projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. (A.M. 29-30).
152. He [the controller tracking Flight 77] tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the airline. Again there was nothing. (A.M. 30).
153. At the same time [8:56 A.M.], the Indianapolis Center made the first of ten unsuccessful attempts over the next six and a half minutes to contact the aircraft via radio. (A.M. 30).
154. By 8:58 A.M., FAA air traffic control contacted American to advise the airline that contact had been lost with Flight 77. (A.M. 30).
155. Shortly thereafter, American Airlines dispatchers made the first of several unsuccessful attempts over three minutes to contact Flight 77, using the ACARS

email system to advise the flight crew to contact the Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center. (A.M. 30).

156. 9:00 A.M. American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learned that communication had been lost with Flight 77. (A.M. 30).
157. He [American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey] ordered all American Airlines flights in the Northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground. (A.M. 30).
158. American Airlines made a nationwide ground stop between 9:05 and 9:10 A.M. on September 11. (C.R. 10).
159. Also at 9:00 A.M., Flight 77 headed east and shortly thereafter began to descend. (A.M. 30).
160. 9:05 A.M. Flight 77 re-emerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes, well east of its last known position. (A.M. 30).
161. However, the aircraft was not detected by air traffic controllers because they were searching along its projected flight path to the west and southwest. (A.M. 30).
162. By 9:08 A.M., officials in American Airlines' SOC had concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77. (A.M. 30).
163. At some time between 9:00 A.M. and 9:10 A.M., an American Airlines air traffic control specialist at SOC who was in communication with the Herndon Command Center notified SOC air traffic control manager that he had learned United was "missing a plane." American headquarters extended its ground stop nationwide. (A.M. 31).
164. Shortly after 9:00 A.M., the American Airlines managing director of dispatch operations telephoned his brother who worked at United and that the director's brother told him that UAL had "some planes missing." However, the airline informed Commission staff that the brother did not recall the conversation. (A.M. 94 n.253).
165. Craig Marquis placed this time at approximately 9:00 A.M., while in his interview Gerard Arpey recalled the time as between 9:05 and 9:10. The most recent information from AAL now indicates the Halleck call to Herndon took place "some time after" 9:10 A.M. No evidence relating to this call has been found in the Commission's review of the Herndon tapes and transcripts. (A.M. 94 n.259).
166. 9:11 A.M. Renee May, a flight attendant, attempted to call her parents but the call did not connect. A second call to the same number at 9:12 A.M. did go through. (A.M. 31, C.R. 9).

167. In the conversation, May told her mother that her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them-the mother was not sure whether her daughter meant all the passengers or just the crew-to the rear of the plane. (A.M. 31).
168. May asked her mother to call American Airlines and make sure that they knew about the hijacking, giving her three phone numbers in Northern Virginia to call. (A.M. 31).
169. At some point between 9:12 A.M. and the crash of Flight 77 into the Pentagon (9:37:46 A.M.), Renee May's parents reached an American Airlines employee at Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C., giving her the information provided by their daughter, including her phone number on board and the flight number. Initially, the American employee thought the Mays were talking about the aircraft that had crashed into the World Trade Center. May's mother reiterated that she was speaking of Flight 77, still in the air. (A.M. 31).
170. At some point after completing the call, the American employee was told to evacuate the building. (A.M. 31).
171. She informed a flight services manager at the airport about her conversation with May's parents. (A.M. 31).
172. At some point between 9:16 A.M. and 9:26 A.M., Barbara Olson, a Flight 77 passenger, called her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. (A.M. 32, C.R. 9).
173. Olson spoke to his wife for about one minute before the call was cut off. She reported that the flight had been hijacked and the hijackers were wielding knives and box cutters. She did not mention stabbing or slashing of the crew or passengers. The hijackers, she said, were not aware of her phone call. (A.M. 32, C.R. 9).
174. All of the passengers were in the back of the plane. Barbara Olson had been seated in first class. (A.M. 32, C.R. 9).
175. After this call, Ted Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft. (A.M. 32).
176. Between 9:20 A.M. and 9:31 A.M., Barbara Olson again called her husband. During their second conversation, she reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked and she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do. Ted Olson asked for her location. She said that the aircraft was flying over houses. Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast. (A.M. 32, C.R. 9).
177. Ted Olson informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes, but she did not display signs of panic or indicate any awareness of an impending crash. The call abruptly ended. (A.M. 32, C.R. 9).

178. The records available for the phone calls from American Airlines Flight 77 do not allow for a determination of which of four "connected calls to unknown numbers" represent the two connections between Barbara and Ted Olson, although it is believed that all four of these calls represent communications between Barbara Olson and her husband's office (all family members of the Flight 77 passengers and crew were canvassed to see if they had received any phone calls from the hijacked flight, and only Renee May's parents and Ted Olson indicated that they had received such calls). The four calls were at 9:15:34 for one minute, 42 seconds; 9:20:15 for four minutes, 34 seconds; 9:25:48 for two minutes, 34 seconds; and 9:30:56 for four minutes, 20 seconds. (A.M. 94 n.265).
179. A witness in Theodore Olson's office recalled that at approximately 9:00 A.M., she received a series of six to eight collect calls from an unknown caller that did not go through. These were followed by a collect call from Barbara Olson, via an operator, which the witness accepted and transferred to Ted Olson. According to the witness, this call was followed a few (perhaps five) minutes later by a direct call from Barbara Olson, which the witness put through to Ted Olson. (A.M. 94 n.266).
180. At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged. (C.R. 9).
181. 9:29 A.M. Flight 77 was now flying at 7,000 feet and was approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon. (A.M. 33, C.R. 9).
182. At or shortly after 9:32 A.M., controllers at the Dulles TRACON "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed." This was later determined to have been Flight 77. (A.M. 33).
183. At 9:34, American 77 was five miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began a 330-degree turn. At the end of the turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington. The hijacker pilot then advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the Pentagon. (C.R. 9).
184. 9:37:46 A.M., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. The aircraft was traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour on impact. All on board were killed, along with 125 civilian and military personnel in the Pentagon. (A.M. 34, C.R. 10).
185. 9:42 A.M. American's director of safety programs, who happened to be in Washington, DC at the time, confirmed for American Airlines officials that "something has hit the Pentagon." (A.M. 34).
186. 9:45 A.M. An official at American headquarters called United headquarters to inform them that an aircraft had hit the Pentagon and that American believed it was a U.S. Airways turbojet. (A.M. 34).
187. By no later than 10:30 A.M., American confirmed that Flight 77 had crashed into the Pentagon. (A.M. 34).

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93

188. Hijackers: Ziad Samir Jarrah (pilot); Saeed al Ghamdi; Ahmed al Nami; Ahmad al Haznawi. (A.M. 35).
189. Personal financial records do not reflect weapons purchases by any of the hijackers. However, the FBI recovered 14 knives or portions of knives, including a box cutter, at the Flight 93 crash site. (A.M. 35).
190. At 7:03 A.M., Saeed al Ghamdi checked in at the United Air Lines ticket counter at Newark airport but checked no baggage. (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
191. Ahmed al Nami checked two bags. (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
192. At 7:24 A.M., Ahmad al Haznawi checked a single bag. (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
193. Finally, at 7:39 A.M., Ziad Jarrah checked in at the UAL ticket counter; he did not have any luggage. (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
194. Only Ahmad al Haznawi was selected by CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded on the plane after confirmation that Haznawi was on board. (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
195. To reach their departure gate, after checking in, the hijackers had to pass through a single checkpoint that serviced United Air Lines flights from the concourse from which Flight 93 departed. (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
196. The checkpoint was the custodial responsibility of United Air Lines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security. (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
197. The checkpoint featured three walk-through metal detectors, two X-ray machines, and explosive trace detection equipment. On 9/11, after the attacks, the FAA's New York Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO) conducted an investigation of the checkpoint used to screen passengers for Flight 93. (A.M. 97 n.298).
198. At 7:39 A.M., Haznawi and Ghamdi boarded the aircraft. Haznawi sat in 6B (first class) and Ghamdi in 3D (first class). (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
199. At 7:40 A.M., Nami boarded and sat in 3C (first class). (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
200. At 7:48 A.M., Jarrah boarded and sat in 1B (first class). (A.M. 35, C.R. 4).
201. In September 2001 and during certain other periods earlier in the year, United Air Lines Flight 93 provided daily, nonstop service from Newark (Liberty) International Airport in New Jersey to San Francisco International Airport. (A.M. 35).

202. On September 11, it [UA Flight 93] was scheduled for an 8:00 A.M. departure. (A.M. 35).
203. The aircraft was a Boeing 757. Tail number N591UA. (A.M. 35, C.R. 10).
204. The plane was piloted by Captain Jason Dahl and First Officer Lee Roy Homer. Five flight attendants provided cabin services:
 - a. Chief flight attendant Deborah Welsh, assigned to seat J1 in first class;
 - b. Sandra Bradshaw, assigned to seat J5 in coach;
 - c. Wanda Green, assigned to seat J4 in first class;
 - d. Lorraine Bay, assigned to seat J3 in coach; and
 - e. CeeCee Lyles, assigned to seat J6 in coach. (A.M. 35, C.R. 10, C.R. 455 n.62).
205. Ten passengers were seated in first class, including all four of the hijackers; the other 27 were in coach. (A.M. 36, C.R. 10).
206. On Flight 93, the cockpit key was kept in a storage compartment in the front of the airplane. (A.M. 36).
207. It was United Air Lines' policy at the time not to provide individual flight attendants with a key to the cockpit door. (A.M. 36).
208. At 8:00 A.M., Flight 93 pushed back from gate 17A at Newark Airport and taxied to its departure area. (A.M. 36; C.M. 455 n.63).
209. Because of typical local air traffic congestion, the flight was delayed 42 minutes. It remained in a holding status until 8:42 A.M., when it departed. (A.M. 36, C.R. 10).
210. 9:02 A.M. The flight reached its cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. (A.M. 36).
211. Beginning at 9:03 A.M., several dispatchers sent ACARS messages to several United flights indicating that aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. These messages provided no details or warnings, however. (A.M. 36).
212. 9:08 A.M. Ballinger, the United flight dispatcher, began to send out ACARS messages notifying United's transcontinental flights that had not yet taken off that a ground stop had been ordered for commercial aircraft in the New York area. (A.M. 37).
213. At 9:19 A.M., shortly after he became aware of the second crash into the World Trade Center, Ballinger began sending cockpit warnings via text messages to the 16 transcontinental flights under his jurisdiction, including Flight 93. The messages were sent out in groups; Flight 93 received its message several minutes later. This represented the first occasion on 9/11 when either American or United sent out such a warning to their airborne aircraft. (A.M. 37, C.R. 11).

214. 9:21 A.M. Ballinger received a routine ACARS message from the aircraft: "Good mornin' ... Nice clb [climb] outta EWR [Newark airport] after a nice tour of the apt [apartment] courts y [and] grd cntrl. 20 N EWC At 350 occl [occasional] It [light] chop. Wind 290/50 ain't helping. J." (A.M. 37).
215. Also at 9:21 A.M., the UAL air traffic control coordinator sent out a message to UAL dispatchers: "There may be Addnl hijackings in progress. You may want to advise your flts to stay on alert and shut down all cockpit access Inflt. [inflight] Sandy per Mgmt." (A.M. 37).
216. 9:22 A.M. An ACARS text message was sent to First Officer LeRoy Homer at the request of his wife, who was concerned about her husband after hearing about the attacks on the World Trade Center. (A.M. 37).
217. 9:23 A.M. Ballinger sent an ACARS message to Flight 93's flight deck: "Beware any cockpit intrusion-Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center." (A.M. 37).
218. At 9:24, Ballinger's warning to United 93 was received in the cockpit. (C.R.11).
219. [A]t 9:26A.M., Flight 93 asked for confirmation of the ACARS message sent at 9:23A.M. and received in the cockpit at 9:24 A.M. "Ed cofirm latest mssg plz-- Jason." (A.M. 38, C.R. 11).
220. 9:27A.M. The Flight 93 flight crew responded to routine radio contact from the FAA air traffic control center in Cleveland. This was the last communication from the flight's cockpit crew. (A.M. 38).
221. [O]n September 11, 2001, passengers aboard United Airlines flights could monitor communications between FAA air traffic controllers and the pilots by selecting channel 9 on their headsets. It is possible that the hijackers on board Flight 93 could have heard the conversations between the Cleveland controller and the other aircraft in which the serious situation in New York City was mentioned. (A.M. 98 n.326).
222. At 9:28 A.M., the hijackers began their takeover of the aircraft. (A.M. 38, C.R. 11).
223. They wielded knives (reported by at least five callers); engaged in violence, including stabbing (reported by at least four callers and indicated by the sounds of the cockpit struggle transmitted over the radio); relocated the passengers to the back of the plane (reported by at least two callers); threatened use of a bomb, either real or fake (reported by at least three callers); and engaged in deception about their intentions (as indicated by the hijacker's radio transmission received by FAA air traffic control). (A.M. 38).
224. 9:28 A.M. The aircraft was traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio. It suddenly began to descend, dropping 685 feet over the next half minute. (A.M. 38, C.R. 11).

225. Eleven seconds into the descent, Cleveland Center overheard the first of two radio transmissions from the Flight 93 cockpit. The captain or first officer declared "Mayday" amid sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. (A.M. 38, C.R. 11).
226. The United 93 timeline in FAA report, 'Summary of Air Traffic Hijack Events September 11, 2001,' Sept. 17, 2001, states that at 9:28:54 a 'second radio transmission, mostly unintelligible, again with sounds of possible screaming or a struggle and a statement, 'get out of here, get out of here' from an unknown origin was heard over the ZOB [Cleveland Center] radio. (A.M. 98 n.329).
227. The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the clash was still in progress. The captain or first officer shouted: "Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here." (A.M. 38, C.R. 11).
228. The screaming in this second radio transmission was heard by the Cleveland controller responsible for Flight 93. (A.M. 38).
229. At approximately 9:30 A.M., air traffic control informed United headquarters that Flight 93 was not responding to attempted radio contacts. (A.M. 39).
230. 9:30 A.M. The Cleveland controller began to poll the other flights on his frequency to determine if they heard the screaming; several said they had. (A.M. 39).
231. At 9:31:21, ExecuJet 56 also called in, reporting that "we're just answering your call. We did hear that, uh, yelling too." The FAA responded, at 9:31:51: "Okay, thanks. We're just trying to figure out what's going on." (A.M. 98 n.334).
232. 9:31 A.M. United dispatchers were advised by United headquarters officials that there was a potential problem with Flight 93. (A.M. 39).
233. 9:32 A.M. The Cleveland controller overheard a transmission of threatening language from Flight 93: "Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit." (A.M. 39, C.R. 12).
234. In accordance with FAA regulations, United 93 had a cockpit voice recorder that recorded in 30 minute loops via microphones in the pilots' headsets, as well as in the overhead panel of the flight deck. This is the only cockpit voice recorder from the four hijacked airplanes to survive the impact and ensuing fire. It recorded the last 31 minutes of the flight. The CVRs and flight data recorders (FDRs) from American 11 and United 175 were not found, and the CVR from American Flight 77 was badly burned and not recoverable. The Flight 93 recording started at 9:32 A.M. through the end of the flight. (A.M. 98 n.316, C.R. 456 n. 76).
235. The cockpit voice recording also indicates that a woman [...] was being held captive in the cockpit. (A.M. 39, C.R. 12).

236. Also at 9:32 A.M., Ballinger began sending a new ACARS message ("High security alert. Secure cockpit.") to his flights. This communication was transmitted to Flight 93 at 9:33 A.M. (A.M. 39).
237. [Between 9:34 A.M. and 9:38 A.M.] The [Cleveland] controller continued to try to contact Flight 93, and asked whether the pilot could confirm that he had been hijacked. There was no response. (A.M. 39).
238. 9:36 A.M. A flight attendant contacted the United Air Lines maintenance facility in San Francisco. (The same facility that the flight attendant aboard United 175 had called to report the hijacking of that flight). (A.M. 40).
239. Her call was first answered by a United maintenance employee and was subsequently taken over by a manager at the facility. (A.M. 40).
240. The flight attendant, reporting from the back of the plane, told the maintenance employees that hijackers were in the cabin behind the first-class curtain and in the cockpit. They had announced they had a bomb on the plane. The hijackers had pulled a knife. They had killed a flight attendant. (A.M. 40).
241. The manager then instructed the air phone operator to try and reestablish contact with the plane, but the effort was unsuccessful. (A.M. 40).
242. GTE cell phone records indicate that an air phone call was made from Flight 93 to United's maintenance facility in San Francisco at 9:32 A.M. lasting 95 seconds. Another call of longer duration was indicated at 9:36. The SAMC personnel interviewed by the airline, the FBI, and the Commission report receiving only a single phone call from Flight 93, most likely the later one. According to United, the first call may have never been received, because it was in a queue among other calls being received by the facility. (A.M. 99 n.341).
243. At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to care. (A.M. 40).
244. At least ten passengers and two crew members shared vital information with family, friends, colleagues, or others on the ground, including: the plane had been hijacked; the hijackers wielded knives; the hijackers had entered the cockpit; the hijackers had a bomb; hijackers wore red bandanas; passengers were forced to the back of the aircraft; a passenger had been stabbed (reported by at least two callers), and the victim had died (reported by one); two individuals were lying on the floor of the aircraft injured or dead, possibly the captain and first officer; and a flight attendant had been killed. (A.M. 40, C.R. 13).
245. The calls provided information very similar to that received from the other hijacked aircraft, including the hijackers' use of knives, violence, the threat of a bomb, relocation of passengers to the back of the aircraft and cockpit intrusion. (A.M. 40).

246. During five of the passengers' phone calls, information was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier that morning at the World Trade Center. Five calls described the intent of passengers and surviving crew members to revolt against the hijackers. According to one call, they voted on whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. (C.R. 13).
247. [C]alls were made from air phones installed in the last nine rows of the aircraft. (A.M. 40).
248. United Air Lines manifest records for Flight 93 show that passengers Thomas Burnett, Mark Bingham, Joseph DeLuca, Edward Felt, Linda Grondlund, and Mark Rothenberg were the six passengers holding first-class cabin seats, in addition to all four hijackers. Only Rothenberg is not known to have communicated with the ground during the flight. (A.M. 99 n.354).
249. The air phone system aboard the flight limited to eight the number of calls that could be made at one time. (A.M. 40).
250. 9:36A.M. The hijackers struggled to control a defiant hostage eventually killing or otherwise silencing her. (A.M. 41, C.R. 12).
251. Also at 9:36A.M., the United manager of flight dispatch operations advised Ballinger that Flight 93 was "off track, heading for D.C." (A.M. 41).
252. By this point [9:36 A.M.], United headquarters believed the aircraft had been hijacked. (A.M. 41).
253. Another UAL dispatcher, assisting Ballinger, sent an ACARS message to Flight 93, asking, "How's the wx.(?) Can dispatch be of any assistance?" (A.M. 41).
254. 9:37 A.M. A passenger made the first of several calls to his wife. During these calls, he reported that: the plane had been hijacked; the hijackers claimed to have a bomb; and a passenger had been knifed. He thought one of them had a gun. He didn't think they had a bomb because he couldn't see it. (A.M. 42).
255. The passenger asked his wife if she had heard about any other planes. His wife informed him about the World Trade Center. The passenger asked if the planes that crashed into the towers were commercial. (A.M. 42).
256. In one of the later calls to his wife, the passenger reported that the passenger that had been knifed had died; that "they" were in the cockpit; and that a group of passengers were getting ready to do something. (A.M. 42).
257. Between 9:37A.M. and 9:57A.M., a passenger was in contact his wife and his mother-in-law, who immediately called 911 on her cell phone. (A.M. 42).
258. The passenger told his family that Flight 93 had been hijacked by three "Iranian-looking" males, with dark skin and bandanas; one of the males stated that he was in

possession of a bomb in a red box and one was armed with a knife; the captain had not made any announcements; the hijackers had herded the passengers into the rear of the plane; the three hijackers had entered the cockpit. (A.M. 42).

259. He and other passengers were contemplating "rushing" the hijackers; he did not observe any guns in the possession of the hijackers; the passengers were voting on whether to storm the cockpit and retake control of the airplane. (A.M. 42, C.R. 13).
260. 9:39 A.M. The Cleveland Center controller overheard the following radio transmission from Flight 93: "Uh, is the captain. Would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport, and to have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet." (A.M. 42, C.R. 12, C.R. 29).
261. 9:39 A.M. A passenger called her husband and left a message that the flight had been hijacked. (A.M. 42).
262. 9:43 A.M. A passenger contacted his father to inform him that his flight had been hijacked. (A.M. 43).
263. 9:44 A.M. A passenger contacted GTE air phone operators. His connection lasted for the remainder of the flight. He noted the following: The flight had been hijacked, and the captain and first officer were lying on the floor of the first-class cabin and were injured or possibly dead. One of the hijackers had a red belt with a bomb strapped to his waist. Two of the hijackers, who had knives, entered the cockpit and closed the door behind them. At some point the hijackers closed the curtain between first class and coach so that passengers could not see into first class; those in the rear of the plane were not being monitored by the hijackers. The plane was going up and down and had turned or changed direction. He and some other passengers were planning something and he was going to put the phone down. (A.M. 43).
264. Also at 9:46 A.M., a passenger contacted her sister and left a voice mail message: her flight had been hijacked by terrorists and they said they had a bomb; she knew that terrorists had already flown a couple of planes into the World Trade Center; it looked like they were going to take this one down as well. (A.M. 44).
265. 9:48 A.M. A flight attendant called her husband, using an air phone, and left a message: the aircraft had been hijacked; there were three hijackers; the plane had turned around; and she'd heard that planes had flown into the World Trade Center. (A.M. 44).
266. 9:49 A.M. A passenger called her boyfriend: her plane was hijacked; the hijackers had cut two passengers' throats; she knew that two planes had crashed into the WTC. (A.M. 44, C.R. 13).
267. 9:50 A.M. A flight attendant called her husband to report the emergency. The call lasted approximately eight minutes. (A.M. 44).

268. A flight attendant seemed to be aware of the other hijackings that morning. (A.M. 44).
269. Her husband told her he was watching the television and confirmed to her that two planes had crashed into the World Trade Center. (A.M. 44).
270. The flight attendant told her husband that the plane had been hijacked by three men. She said the hijackers were carrying knives and had put on red headbands as they were hijacking the plane. (A.M. 44).
271. She [flight attendant] said that the passengers had been moved to the rear of the plane and that the hijackers were up front. (A.M. 44).
272. She [flight attendant] said that the passengers were discussing how to overpower the hijackers, including preparing hot water to throw on the hijackers and then to rush them. (A.M. 44, C.R. 13).
273. 9:54 A.M. A passenger phoned her stepmother and told her that the plane had been hijacked. The call lasted approximately four and a half minutes. Before hanging up, the passenger said she had to go because they were trying to break into the cockpit. (A.M. 44).
274. At 9:55:11, Ziad Jarrah dialed in the VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) frequency for the VOR navigational aid at Washington Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C. (A.M. 45, C.R. 457 n.85).
275. An air phone operator, who had been on the line with a passenger since 9:44 A.M., heard someone say: "Are you guys ready? Okay! Let's roll!" Shortly thereafter she heard screaming followed by silence. (A.M. 45).
276. The Flight attendant who had called her husband at 9:50 A.M. ended her phone call. She said, "Everyone is running up to first class. I've got to go. Bye." She hung up the phone. (A.M. 45, C.R. 13).
277. 9:57 A.M. The passengers began their revolt. The sounds of the passenger uprising captured by the cockpit voice recorder suggest that a great struggle began at the back of the airplane and progressed toward the front. The evidence from the CVR indicates that the struggle continued for the duration of the flight. (A.M. 45, C.R. 13).
278. 9:58 A.M. A passenger called 911 in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, from his cell phone to report a hijacking in progress. (A.M. 45).
279. Also at 9:58 A.M., a flight attendant contacted her husband by cell phone. She told him again that the plane had been hijacked and they were forcing their way into the cockpit. (A.M. 45).

280. In response to the passenger revolt, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left and right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. (A.M. 45).
281. At 9:58:57, Jarrah told another hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane sharply left and right, but the assault continued. (A.M. 45, C.R. 13).
282. At 9:59:52, Jarrah changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disrupt the assault. The recorder captured the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shouts, and breaking glasses and plates. (A.M. 45, C.R. 13-14).
283. At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane. Five seconds later, Jarrah asked, "Is that it? Shall we finish it off?" A hijacker responded, "No. Not yet. When they all come, we finish it off." The sounds of fighting continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and down. (A.M. 45, C.R. 14).
284. At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said, "In the cockpit. If we don't we'll die!" Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled "Roll it!" (A.M. 45, C.R. 14).
285. At about 10:01 A.M., Jarrah stopped his violent maneuvers and said, "Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!" He then asked another hijacker in the cockpit, "Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?" to which the other replied, "Yes, put it in it, and pull it down." (A.M. 46, C.R. 14).
286. At 10:01 A.M., two minutes before Flight 93 crashed, Command Center updated FAA headquarters that the flight was "rocking its wings." (A.M. 46).
287. The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker said, "Pull it down! Pull it down!" (A.M. 46, C.R. 14).
288. The airplane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to the right. The airplane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting "Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest." (A.M. 46, C.R. 14).
289. 10:03:11 A.M. With the sounds of the passenger counterattack continuing, Flight 93 crashed into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes' flying time from Washington, D.C. (A.M. 46, C.R. 14).
290. By this same time [10:15 A.M.], United headquarters had confirmed that an aircraft had crashed near Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and believed that this was Flight 93. (A.M. 47).
291. 10:27A.M. United Air Lines advised American Airlines of the crash of Flight 93. (A.M. 47).

HIJACKER TACTICS & HISTORICAL FACTS

292. The hijackers chose-early morning departures from East Coast airports aboard large Boeing 757 and 767 for which they had trained. (A.M. 47).
293. Each of the hijackers purchased a ticket between mid- and late August. (A.M. 47).
294. There is no evidence to suggest that the hijackers or their associates purchased unused tickets for the hijacked flights. (A.M. 47).
295. [Thus for Flights 77 and 93 (both 757s), the hijacker pilots were seated in the very front of the plane, a position that gave him ready access to the cockpit. The other hijackers were seated close behind in first class (or, in the case of two hijackers on Flight 77, in the forward part of coach), covering both sides of the aisle.] (A.M. 48).
296. The strength of the cockpit doors in use on 9/11 would not have precluded forced entry. (A.M. 48).
297. However, cockpit keys were available aboard the aircraft. (A.M. 48).
298. On September 11, 2001, a single key fit the cockpit doors of all Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft. (A.M. 48).
299. There was no evidence to suggest any of the hijackers sat in a jump seat in the cockpit. Each of the hijackers had an assigned seat and appears to have used it. (A.M. 48).
300. The hijackers took over the aircraft by force or threat of force, as reported on all four flights. (A.M. 48).
301. Records of purchases by the hijackers, as well as evidence discovered at the crash sites (primarily the site of Flight 93), indicate that the primary weapons of choice were knives with a blade less than 4 inches long. (A.M. 48).
302. According to financial transaction data, at least seven knives were purchased by the 9/11 hijackers including two Victorinox Swiss Army knives, three Leatherman multi-tool knives, two pocket knives, and one Stanley two-piece snap knife set The FBI collected 14 pieces of evidence of knives or portions of knives, including a box cutter, at the Flight 93 crash. (A.M. 101 n.408).
303. The use of knives was cited on all four flights by flight crew and passengers. (A.M. 48).
304. Box cutters were specifically indicated only in one report from Flight 77. (A.M. 48).
305. A box cutter-type implement, along with a variety of short-bladed knives, was found at the crash site of Flight 93. (A.M. 48).

306. Reports from two of the hijacked aircraft (Flights 11 and 175) indicated the presence of Mace and pepper spray in the cabin. (A.M. 48).
307. The FBI collected 14 knives at the Flight 93 crash site. (C.R. 82 n.457).
308. The hijackers used the threat of bombs to frighten and control the passengers. This was reported on all flights except Flight 77. (A.M. 48, C.R. 13).
309. As the hijackings progressed, however, there was evidence of growing awareness on board the aircraft that something beyond a traditional hijacking was under way. (A.M. 49).
310. Callers from both Flights 11 and 175 noted early in the process very erratic flying patterns and talked about the possibility that the hijackers were piloting the aircraft. (A.M. 49).
311. One Flight 175 passenger predicted the hijackers intended to fly the aircraft into a building. (A.M. 49).
312. Another [Flight 175 passenger] said the passengers were considering storming the cockpit. (A.M. 49).
313. Later, well into the hijacking of Flight 77, at least one passenger was told that two planes had crashed into the World Trade Center. (A.M. 49).
314. In the case of Flight 93, the growing awareness among the passengers and crew of what had already occurred on other flights spurred a revolt. (A.M. 49).
315. In early January 2000, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, a nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed living in the UAE, used Marwan al Shehhi's credit card to order a Boeing 747-400 flight simulator program and a Boeing 767 flight deck video, together with attendant literature; the materials were shipped to Ali's employer's address. (C.R. 168).
316. On June 27, 2000, Ziad Jarrah arrived in Newark and then flew to Venice, Florida. He had already arranged to attend the Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC) in Venice. Jarrah moved in with some of the flight instructors affiliated with his school and bought a car. (C.R. 224).
317. In the late spring or early summer 2000, Mohamed Atta visited the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, where Zacarias Moussaoui enrolled several months later and where another al Qaeda operative, Ihab Ali, had taken lessons in the mid 1990s. Atta then began flight instruction at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida. Both Atta and Marwan al Shehhi subsequently enrolled in the Accelerated Pilot Program at that school. By the end of July, both of them took solo flights, and by mid-August they passed the private pilot airman test. They trained through the summer at Huffman, while Ziad Jarrah continued his training at Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC). (C.R. 224).

318. In late September, Mohamed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi decided to enroll at Jones Aviation in Sarasota, Florida, 20 miles north of Venice. An instructor at Jones described the two as aggressive, rude, and sometimes fighting with him to take over the controls during their training flights. In early October, they took the Stage I exam for instruments rating at Jones Aviation and failed. They claimed they were in a hurry because jobs awaited them at home. Atta and Shehhi then returned to Huffman. (C.R. 224).
319. In early August 2000, Ziad Jarrah obtained a single-engine private pilot certificate. (C.R. 224).
320. In 1996, after being rejected by a Saudi flight school, Hani Hanjour came to the United States and checked out flight schools in Florida, California, and Arizona. He briefly started at a couple of them before returning to Saudi Arabia. In 1997, he returned to Florida and then, along with two friends, went back to Arizona and began his flight training. After about three months, Hanjour obtained his private pilot's license. After several more months of training, he earned a commercial pilot certificate, issued by the FAA in April 1999. He then returned to Saudi Arabia. (C.R. 225-26).
321. Nawaf al Hazmi and Hani Hanjour left San Diego almost immediately after Hanjour's arrival on December 8, 2000 and drove to Arizona. Settling in Mesa, Hanjour began refresher training at his old school, Arizona Aviation. He sought training on multi-engine planes but had difficulties because of his inadequate English. The instructor advised him to discontinue but Hanjour said he could not go home without completing the training. In early 2001, he started training on a Boeing 737 simulator at Pan Am International Flight Academy in Mesa. An instructor there found his work well below standard and discouraged him from continuing. Hanjour continued and completed the initial training by the end of March 2001. As early as April 4, 2001, Hanjour and Hazmi arrived in Falls Church, Virginia. (C.R. 226-27).
322. In November 2000, Mohamed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi finished up their training at Huffman Aviation and earned their instrument certificates from the FAA. In mid-December 2000, they passed their commercial pilot tests and received their licenses. They then began training to fly large jets on a flight simulator. At about the same time, Ziad Jarrah began simulator training for large jets, also in Florida but at a different center. (C.R. 227).
323. After returning to Florida from foreign trips in mid-January 2001, Mohamed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi visited Georgia. They briefly stayed in Norcross and Decatur and rented a single-engine plane to fly with an instructor in Lawrenceville. (C.R. 229).
324. American Airlines Flight 11 hijackers included Mohamed Atta, Waleed al Shehri, Wail al Shehri, Satam al Suqami, and Abdul Aziz al Omari. (C.R. 238).

325. United Airlines Flight 175 hijackers included Marwan al Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al Ghamdi, and Mohand al Shehri. (C.R. 238).
326. American Airlines Flight 77 hijackers included Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid al Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, and Salem al Hazmi. (C.R. 239).
327. United Airlines Flight 93 hijackers included Ziad Jarrah, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ahmed al Nami. (C.R. 239).
328. On July 30, 2001, Waleed al Shehri traveled alone from Fort Lauderdale to Boston. He flew to San Francisco the next day, where he stayed one night before returning via Las Vegas. Shehri traveled in first class on the Boeing 767 aircraft. (C.R. 242).
329. Early in the summer of 2001, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah took cross-country surveillance flights. Shehhi flew from New York to Las Vegas via San Francisco in late May. Jarrah flew from Baltimore to Las Vegas via Los Angeles in early June. Atta flew from Boston to Las Vegas via San Francisco at the end of June. Each traveled in first class, on United Airlines. For the east-west transcontinental leg, each operative flew on the same type of aircraft he would pilot on 9/11 (Atta and Shehhi, a Boeing 767; Jarrah, a Boeing 757). (C.R. 242).
330. In the early summer of 2001, Ziad Jarrah and Hani Hanjour received additional flight training and practice flights. A few days before departing on a cross-country test flight, Jarrah flew from Fort Lauderdale to Philadelphia, where he trained at Hortman Aviation. He asked to fly the Hudson Corridor, a low-altitude "hallway" along the Hudson River, where he could pass New York landmarks like the World Trade Center. Hortman deemed Jarrah unfit to fly solo, so he could only fly that route with an instructor. (C.R. 242).
331. In the early summer of 2001, Hani Hanjour requested to fly the Hudson Corridor at Air Fleet Training Systems in Teterboro, New Jersey. Hanjour began receiving ground instruction there soon after settling in the area with Nawaf al Hazmi. Hanjour flew the Hudson Corridor, but his instructor declined a second request because of what he considered Hanjour's poor piloting skills. Shortly thereafter, Hanjour switched to Caldwell Flight Academy in Fairfield, New Jersey, where he rented small aircraft on several occasions during June and July. On July 20, Hanjour rented a plane from Caldwell and took a practice flight from Fairfield to Gaithersburg, Maryland. That route would have allowed him to fly near Washington, D.C. (C.R. 242).
332. On August 7, 2001, Mohamed Atta flew from Fort Lauderdale to Newark. Two days later, Ahmed al Ghamdi and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who had been living in New Jersey with Nawaf al Hazmi and Hani Hanjour, flew to Miami. While Atta was in New Jersey, he, Hazmi, and Hanjour all purchased tickets for another set of surveillance flights. Like Marwan al Shehhi, Waleed al Shehri, Jarrah, Atta, and before them, Hazmi and Hanjour each flew in first class on the same type of aircraft they would hijack on 9/11 (a Boeing 757) and on transcontinental flights that

connected to Las Vegas. That time, Atta himself also flew directly to Las Vegas, where all three stayed on August 13 – 14. (C.R. 248).

333. Through August 2001, the 9/11 hijackers kept busy with gym training and frequent practice flights on small rented aircraft. The operatives also began to make purchases. In mid-August, they bought knives. On August 22, Jarrah attempted to purchase four GPS units from a pilot shop in Miami. He was able to buy only one unit, which he picked up a few days later when he also purchased three aeronautical charts. (C.R. 248–49).
334. Around August 2001, Hani Hanjour successfully conducted a challenging certification flight supervised by an instructor at Congressional Air Charters of Gaithersburg, Maryland. He landed at a small airport with a difficult approach. The instructor thought Hanjour may have had training from a military pilot because he used a terrain recognition system for navigation. (C.R. 531 n.170).
335. All 19 hijacker tickets for 9/11 flights were purchased between August 25 and September 5, 2001. (C.R. 249).
336. The coordinated Plaintiffs further stipulate to the photo identification of the 9/11 hijackers as found in the 9/11 Commission Report. (C.R. 238-239).